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Management of the Mekong River Basin: Contesting its 
sustainability from a Communication Perspective 
 
Malee Traisawasdichai Lang1 
 
 
 
Back then in Thailand’s hottest summer month in April of 1995 in Chiang Rai, 
the farthest northern province of Thailand, where the Mekong River enters its 
lower basin and forms the border between Thailand, Laos and Burma, a group of 
state leaders gathered together. Holding the champagne glasses, the four state 
leaders, representing Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, made a toast for 
the vision of an ambitious management plan for the Mekong River, calling it 
‘sustainable development’. They envisioned construction of dams on both the 
tributaries within national boundaries and the main river of the Mekong. The 
notion of how to tap the energy of the Mekong in the most profitable way is high 
on the agenda.  
 
The Chiang Rai summit officially rang the bell for the opening of the resource of 
the Mekong River to the outsiders. In the past, political and security reasons 
have until recently kept the river largely unspoiled by industrial development 
and unaffected by the state’s regulation and management. This chapter is 
concerned with the contestation of this newly-opened battlefield of resource 
development – the Mekong and its tributaries. It sets out to analyze the contested 
meanings of sustainable development at three different levels, namely structural, 
project and grassroots levels. It begins with the review of the official story at the 
structural level how the state is moulding the meaning of ‘sustainability’. Is 
‘sustainability’ merely a glossy rhetoric promoted by both bi- and multilateral 
donor agencies as well as regional and national leaders in the region? A brief 
historical account of the development initiatives for the Mekong will be given as 
background. It further attempts to bring out the ambiguity and crisis of 
legitimacy of the role of advisors, consultants and professionals alike, subsumed 
under the heading of planners and their planning practice, at the project level. 
The case of the planned Nam Theun 2 project in Laos will illustrate this point. 
Finally, this chapter calls attention to an alternative way of knowing and 
planning that gives recognition to the collective commitment of local 
communities in their defence of their livelihood, culture and ecology. The story 
of ordinary villagers of the Mool River in the northeast of Thailand in their 
struggle against the Pak Mool Dam will be told. Their challenge to the state’s 
imposition of ‘sustainable development’ and their strategies for resistance aimed 
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at restoration of the river, their own subsistence and partial autonomy over the 
community’s right to the river management will be recalled. 
 
In this chapter, ‘communication’ is the theme for analyzing this contestable 
terrain of ‘sustainability’ of how to best manage the Mekong River and its 
resource. In combining the communication aspect with the dimension of 
planning, I apply the lens of John Forester’s critical planning paradigm, which 
emphasizes the importance of planners and planning practice as shaping public 
attention and understanding (Forester 1980, Sager 1992, Sandercock 1998). 
Here the starting point is that communication among all stakeholders is 
necessary. But communication involves power and reinforces power. This very 
aspect of power unavoidably underlines the political nature of communication. 
 
 
The Politics of Communication 
 
In the face of fierce resource contestation as in the Mekong, communication is in 
every sense highly contested and is deemed necessary as a means to justify 
ones’ attempt to win access to the Mekong’s resource. State is keen to use 
communication to shape the public’s understanding of particular activities by 
choosing to tell certain stories, causing the public to believe what it desires to let 
them believe. But what are the stories that have been excluded from this official 
communication? Contesting the state’s side of the story, affected communities 
have begun to seek communicative space with the public to insert their stories 
that have previously been erased in the official stories. Their aim is to 
communicate their own meanings to the public to make sure that the stories of 
the little people would not be reduced into one single grand narrative of the 
state. 
 
Nevertheless, there is another potential level to counteract this power 
domination. This is through the role of planners as suggested by Forester, who is 
clear to say that relations of power do exist in all planning practice. He calls this 
relation of power as the ‘structure of systematically but unnecessary distorted 
communication’ (Forester 1980). Planners, who may wear the hats as 
consultants, advisors, researchers, experts and professionals, should be aware of 
this presence in power relations and work out to correct this ‘systematic 
distorted communication’ via their communicative action (Forester 1980). They 
should pay attention to listening and including the views of affected 
communities, seeking to understand their contextual, concrete and particular 
nature through a genuine consultation process. In this sense, planners have an 
important task to allow communicative space for affected communities in the 
first place when certain projects are initially being proposed. This is to keep in 
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mind that the ability between state and project proponents on the one hand and 
affected communities on the other, to access communication is highly unequal.  
 
 
The setting: Mekong River 
 
The greatness of the Mekong River has been generally recognized not only 
because of its historical value, but also because of its natural wealth. For 
historians and archaeologists alike, the Mekong is the cradle of the ancient 
Khmer civilization prior to the mid 14th century, as evidenced by the existence 
of the glorious temples, including Angkor Wat in Cambodia, Phanomrung and 
Pimay in North-eastern Thailand and Wat Pu in southern Laos (Srisakara 
Vallibhodom in Traisawasdichai, March 15, 1992, and Kasetsiri 2000). In terms 
of resource, the river has, for generations, supported the livelihood of some 50 
millions of people along its course and tributaries in the lower basin alone. The 
Mekong’s natural flooding regime carries silt deposit to farm land, enriching the 
rice growing area of the Mekong delta in Vietnam. The fisheries resource of the 
Mekong is vital for the small scale and subsistence economy of local population 
in the region. The river itself has been the major route for people to travel from 
place to place, particularly significant in areas with no road access. It irrigates 
farmers’ land in the dry season and provides drinking water for the people.  
 
Geographically, the 4,800-kilometre long Mekong originates from the Tanghla 
Shan Mountains on the Tibetan plateau at the elevation of some 5,000 metres, 
meandering through the gorges and mountainous area of Yunnan southern 
province of China, passing Burma, separating Thailand and Laos, feeding into 
the Tonle Sap Great Lake in Cambodia, and dividing itself into nine branches at 
the Mekong delta in Vietnam before emptying itself in the South China Sea. The 
Mekong is the longest river in Southeast Asia and twelfth in the world. With its 
annual runoff above 475,000 million cubic metres, the Mekong ranks the eighth 
in the world and twenty first in term of drainage area covering 795,000 sq km 
(MRC Secretariat 1995).  
 
Memories of the past as well as the river’s geographical location linking six 
countries of different ideological and political regimes have created both unique, 
and at time rivalry, histories for these nations and special attachments for people 
along both banks of the river. The Mekong has become symbol of various 
imaginations: `river of hatred, of love, of war and terror, of peace and happiness, 
of life and food security´. One of its legends reveals the official imaginary of the 
Mekong, one which is striving to tap the natural wealth of the Mekong for 
economic, political and strategic reasons.  
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The official vision 
 
‘The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to 
dwarf even our own Tennessee Valley Authority’, President Johnson of the 
United States (quoted in White 1969). 
 
The first ever idea to exploit the Mekong River resource had emerged in the 
1950s when the cold war confrontation in the region started to take place. With 
strategic interest in mainland Southeast Asia, the US was leading the planning of 
the Mekong resource development. The US Bureau of Reclamation carried out 
the first preliminary survey of the lower basin and launched its report in 1956. 
The United Nations helped set up the Mekong Committee (MC) in 1957 to 
coordinate and look for the possibility for water resource development (Sluiter 
1992). Excluding Burma and communist China, the MC comprised four Mekong 
riparian states in the lower basin, including Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and 
Vietnam.  
 
In 1970, American engineers launched the first grand scale hydropower plan for 
the Mekong. The Indicative Basin Plan, known as the Mekong blueprint, was 
modelled on the river management of the Colombia basin in the US (George 
Radosevich in Traisawasdichai 1995). The Mekong blueprint envisioned the 
construction of a cascade of seven mammoth mainstream dams, which could 
store 29 per cent of the Mekong’s annual discharge and produce electricity of 
23,300 megawatts (Norconsult 1994). The plan, as a product of the cold war, 
‘excluded totally the portion of the Mekong in the upper basin in China like it 
had never existed on any world map’ (Grainne Ryder in Sluiter 1992). Two 
projects, Strung Treng in Cambodia and the 4,800-megawatt Pa Mong Dam with 
the height of over 100 metres near capital Vientiane in Laos, were planned to be 
the first two mainstream dams in the Mekong cascade (Norconsult). 
 
However, no dams in the Mekong blueprint have ever been built due to three 
decades of civil wars. The MC was dissolved in 1975 when the Indochinese 
states came under full control of the communist governments and the US 
withdrew its influence as well as its financial contributions. The Interim Mekong 
Committee (IMC) was then set up in 1978, without Cambodia. Despite the 
turbulent circumstances, the Mekong Secretariat, the research and technical arm 
of the already dissolved MC, continued to function with reduced budget from 
the UN (Mitchell 1994). Another Mekong plan was released in 1987 but this 
revised indicative plan gave no substantial change from the previous Mekong 
blueprint except a reduction in the height of Pa Mong Dam (Mitchell). Once 
again conflict among member states in 1992 led to the dissolution of the IMC. 
When Thailand proposed an ambitious plan to divert water from the Mekong 
mainstream to irrigate its drought-stricken north-eastern region, Laos and 
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Vietnam used their right to veto. This led Thailand to withdraw its membership 
and it now preferred to pursue its own ‘sovereign right’ to go ahead with the 
project outside the framework of the MC (Prathet Sutabutr, personal 
communication 1995). 
 
It has been clear that the US involvement in the Mekong planning from the very 
beginning has moulded the model of river management for the Mekong towards 
the US model based on grand scale scheme with construction of cascade of 
dams. This has subsequently become the future vision of later Mekong planners 
until today. 
 
 
The Peace Era 
Interest in the regional hydropower development was renewed with the prospect 
of peace in Cambodia in the early 1990s. The Mekong Secretariat launched the 
Mekong Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower report in 1994, which has 
superseded the two previous plans. The new Mekong plan envisions a cascade 
of eleven run-of-the-river dams on the mainstream, which stretches from Pak 
Beng in northern Laos to Kratie downstream in Cambodia. It is estimated to 
generate a total of 13,000 megawatts of electricity to be fed into the Thai power 
system. If built, the dams would displace 60,000 people and flood 1,900 sq kms 
of land (Mekong Secretariat 1994). 
 
In 1995, under the auspice of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was formed, officially 
superseding its predecessor, the Mekong Committee. The MRC has brought 
back all the four member states, with some rival interests, and has an ambition to 
invite Burma and China, in particular, into the grouping. Its mandate is to 
coordinate the development programmes with emphasis on joint or basin-wide 
development projects through the formulation of a basin development plan. The 
basin plan would be used to identify, categorize and prioritize the projects to 
seek assistance for and to implement at the basin level (MRC 1995). One point 
of criticism from environmentalists has been the argument that the MRC has 
been concerned about nothing, except making a shopping list of projects from 
which donors could choose and buy into.  
 
Apart from that, the MRC has made a considerable effort to persuade Burma 
and, particularly, China, to join the group. Yet, China, which controls 20 per 
cent of the Mekong flow, has never responded to the invitation for fear of 
having to comply with the MRC’s water usage rule. The Mekong Agreement 
stated on paper that the rationale for the cooperation of the Mekong member 
countries is to safeguard ‘the conditions and ecological balance of the Mekong 
from harmful projects’ (MRC 1995). China itself has an ambitious hydropower 
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programme on the upper portion of the Mekong mainstream and internal 
development agenda for its poorer hinterland in landlocked Yunnan area. 
 
Mekong Boom Zone 
Despite the MRC’s presence, the best known and most influential stimulus for 
economic and infrastructure integration in the Mekong has been the emergence 
of the Asian Development Bank’s initiative Greater Mekong Sub region (GMS) 
in 1994. While the MRC has been seen as having a formal and clumsy 
bureaucratic style, the GMS operates as an informal sub regional cooperation 
framework. The GMS has been recognized as much more prominent than the 
MRC as its members consist of all the six Mekong countries, including Burma 
and Yunnan Province of China, something that the MRC has been striving for 
but has never succeeded in accomplishing. The GMS is also prominent for the 
reason that it has proposed the most ambitious, comprehensive and diversified 
infrastructure development programme ever in the Mekong region. 
 
Its vision for the Mekong has been a picture of a prosperous region. It envisions 
that all six countries, in which many of their citizens presently are still living 
below the poverty line, will be linked together by a network of roads, railway 
lines, airlines, telecommunication and electric power transmission lines. The six 
countries would enjoy the free flow of goods and be free of trade barriers. Their 
citizens would enjoy the freedom of travel between states through the promotion 
of a tourism programme. The GMS has attracted a tremendous number of 
foreign private investors and financial institutions to develop the projects. For 
the hydropower sector in particular, the ADB-supported Nam Theun-Hinboun 
dam was completed four years after the GMS was launched. The ADB has 
recently subcontracted the study of the Xe Kong and Se San basin hydropower 
development study in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The bank also mobilized 
the Japanese fund for the construction of the Nam Luek Dam project in Laos. 
 
The Power Hub 
At the turning point of the region’s geopolitics from cold war to peace re-
establishment over the last decade, the ADB through its GMS programme has 
been effectively shaping and determining the direction of development for the 
whole Mekong region. Following the GMS framework, Thailand is now acting 
as the single energy importer and the rest of the Mekong states are playing the 
role of the power exporters. Such influence of the GMS programme is clear 
when examining the national development strategies of the member states. 
Hydropower development has become the top priority in the national 
development agenda in all Mekong states.  
 
In the Mekong region context, constructing dams has been justified by the states 
as a means to earn foreign exchange and, hence, to bring the countries out of 
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poverty. However, there is one powerful critique of this new way to justify dam 
building. In the past, proponents promote dam building as a means to produce 
clean and environmentally friendly energy and assert that dams yield multi-
purpose benefits. In the Mekong region, dam building has the single purpose to 
generate cash by commodifying the Mekong River for export. This implies a 
high degree of uncertainty in which the hydro-electricity exporting countries 
have no control over the fluctuation of the power market. Whether or not the 
dams fulfil their cash-generating function rely externally on the energy market 
or peak demand in Thailand, so far the single energy buyer in the region. 
 
Despite that, confidence is gained by the energy-exporting countries as they 
have been convinced about the stability of the energy market by the GMS’s 
energy sector study. The study affirms that Thailand would be the region’s 
promising energy market for the next three decades until 2020 and predicts that 
the Thai’s energy demand will continuously increase from 9,801 MW in 1993 to 
34,426 MW in 2010, or an average of around 10 per cent per year (Norconsult 
1994). The fall of the Thai energy market as happening today since the 
beginning of the economic crisis in 1997 has not been foreseen in the GMS’s 
plan. 
 
As many as 46 new hydropower projects with an overall installed capacity of 
36,850 MWs have been identified in the GMS plan. All are aimed to produce 
energy to export to Thailand (Norconsult). However, the number of proposed 
dam projects in individual states varies, depending on different sources of 
studies. But, according to the GMS energy study, there are 5 dams (16,050 
MWs) in Yunnan, 18 dams (7,483 MWs) in Vietnam, 9 dams (4,606 MWs) in 
Burma, 15 dams (3,660 MWs) in Laos, 4 dams (3,485 MWs) in Cambodia and 
another 5 projects (1,560 MWs) in Thailand (Norconsult 1994). Some members 
have more ambitious plan than the GMS. Laos, for example, has identified 60 
dam sites with an overall installed capacity of 18,000 MWs (Phonekeo 1995). 
And 23 projects with 6,800 MWs have already been advanced at various stages. 
In Yunnan of China, the 1,500-MW Man Wan Dam has already been completed, 
standing as the first ever mainstream dam on the Mekong. China is currently 
constructing two more dams – the 1,350-MW Dachaoschan and the 1,500-MW 
Jinghong dams. The electricity produced from these dams will be exported to 
Thailand.  
 
It is interesting that the ongoing economic slowdown in the region, resulting in 
the drop of energy demand in Thailand, has not seemed to threaten the ambition 
of the Mekong states to become the power hub in the region. The governments 
of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma and China as well as the World Bank and 
ADB continue to actively promote construction of new dams, without fearing of 
losing the Thai energy market. 
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Yet, is this official vision for the ‘prosperous Mekong’ also desired by the 
citizens and communities who depend on the Mekong? In the midst of the 
official desire for excessive hydropower development, the MRC has come under 
attack for lacking the motivation to safeguard the Mekong. How can dam 
business, promoted by various external actors like the ADB and mediated by 
national governments and investors, meet the MRC’s declared objective of 
‘sustainability’?  Most importantly, has the MRC today become irrelevant to the 
present and long term needs of the local communities of the Mekong region? 
 
 
Dams and Sustainability 
 
The official vision of sustainable development of the Mekong River tries to 
harmonize construction of dams with ‘sustainability’. Yet, there is a 
fundamental thinking embedded in this grand narrative of ‘sustainable 
development’ that excessively gives superiority to the engineers and 
economists’ rationalities for the officially chosen way to develop the Mekong 
River. On the one hand, the dam engineers see the value of a river in terms of 
megawatts (Grainnaie Ryder in Sluiter 1992) and the ecological function of the 
river to empty itself into the sea is a big loss (Traisawasdichai, December 29, 
1995b). On the other hand, the economists put high value to scarcity of resource 
(Sager 1998) and they are trained to find a solution for the efficient allocation of 
this scarce resource in question.  
 
Probing the text of the Mekong agreement, one finds that the two rationalities 
complement each other. The agreement states: 
 
‘To cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management 
and conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin, 
including but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control, 
fisheries… To promote, support…in the development of the full potential of 
sustainable benefits, and the prevention of wasteful use of Mekong River Basin 
waters..’ (MRC 1995: 4).  
 
Yet who are those people making such wasteful use of the Mekong? The 
description of reality in this `public transcript´ (Bryant and Bailey 1997, Scott, 
1990) entails an understanding of the existing pattern of the Mekong resource’s 
use by local communities as wasteful and exploitative. The common logic in this 
‘public transcript’ is none but the renowned metaphor of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ (1970). It is the logic that oversimplifies the long-standing 
practice of rural communities as a threat to the Mekong. When seen through this 
metaphor, the ‘tragedy of the Mekong’ caused by the free riders or rural 
communities is what the authors of this Mekong agreement strive to prevent. For 
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the official point of view, the solution to this imagined reality lies in the 
economics and technical engineering rationalities. That is to invite foreign 
private investors to turn the Mekong current into megawatts (Ryder in Sluiter 
1992) and, then, turn the megawatts into cash through energy export.  
  
But there are limits to these economic and technical rationalities. Be it 
consciously or not, intentionally or unintentionally, the consequence is the 
systematic exclusion of the others’ way of thinking, their aspirations and 
preferred ways of life. What has been absent from the Mekong `public 
transcript´ is the description about why the Mekong has remained fertile and 
unspoiled until today and who has helped ensure this condition. 
 
One serious limitation of the two rationalities is their tendency to depoliticize 
the political issue of resource contestation. Damming the Mekong is merely an 
engineering technical matter and relies exclusively on neutral manipulation of 
economic efficiency principle (Sager). Shifting the river resource away from 
local communities to serve the interests of foreign dam builders is justified as a 
way to efficiently manage and allocate resource for the optimal use. Thus, the 
apolitical language effectively distorts the real political issue of unequal 
distribution and reprioritisation of resource as well as displacement of the 
present resource users (Bryant and Bailey 1997).  
 
Behind the official grand narrative of sustainable development also lies a 
‘systematically distorted communication’ (Forester), which involves power. It 
emerges when the authors of this grand narrative, intentionally or not, 
communicate strategic, moral and political meaning that equates dam building to 
‘sustainability’. The power of such system of thought, which is both persuasive 
and authoritative, produces the systematic exclusions of other meanings of 
‘sustainability’. This excluded meaning is the one that encompasses the 
concerns and aspirations of rural communities of the Mekong.  
 
As official policies have increasingly provided an open access for numerous 
foreign dam builders to the unspoiled Mekong River, it remains a central 
question, how the MRC would equip itself to prevent the ‘real tragedy of the 
Mekong’. 
 
 
Mekong Watchdog? 
 
On April 5, 1995, the heads of the four lower Mekong states arrived in Chiang 
Rai for the signing ceremony of the new Mekong agreement, that would give 
birth to the Mekong River Commission. As scheduled, the Thai hosts would 
arrange a symbolic cruise along the Kok River, a branch of the Mekong in 
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Chiang Rai, before the signing took place. But as the group of these VIPs 
arrived at the pier, the boat driver informed the officials that the boat could not 
sail because of the sudden water drop in the Kok River. The cause for this 
unusual water drop took place beyond the Thai border. It was in the upstream 
Yunnan where the Chinese was in the middle of constructing the Man Wan 
Dam, the first mainstream dam on the Mekong, and needed to block the water to 
allow the construction work. Amid the Thai hosts’ embarrassment, the planned 
symbolic cruise was cancelled and the VIPs were driven back to the hotel 
(personal communication, Chiang Rai, April 1995). 
 
The Chiang Rai provincial governor on the next day phoned the Chinese 
officials, informing about this unprecedented incidence. He requested China to 
inform the downstream countries if and when China wants to block the water in 
the Mekong channel again. The Chinese officials apologized and, a day later, 
water returned to the Kok River. 
 
What did this incidence signal to the MRC? Indeed, the ‘sustainable 
development’ rationale, which is the basis for the creation of the MRC, suggests 
one important task of environmental protection for the organization. The MRC 
is currently the only intergovernmental body which has full authority to mediate, 
negotiate with other parties and, importantly, at least in principle, safeguard the 
well being of both the Mekong River and its citizens. It is the added 
environmental mandate that has justified the MRC’s existence and has 
distinguished the MRC from its predecessor, Mekong Committee, which 
focused narrowly on exploitation of the river (MRC 1995). 
 
But, it is also paradoxical that the MRC’s water usage rule, which signifies its 
environmental mandate, is weaker than the Mekong Committee’s 1975 water 
usage rule. In the 1975 rule, member states possessed the right to veto potential 
harmful projects. All states were also obliged to provide water quality impact 
studies of their proposed projects. They must receive approval from other 
members before they could proceed with their projects (Traisawasdichai, 
December 29, 1995a). In contrast, the present water usage rule abolishes the 
states’ veto right and the requirement to submit impact studies for all projects as 
the basis for approval, no matter if they are mainstream or tributary, intra- or 
inter basin ones. Agreement from member states is required only for proposals 
that feature mainstream inter-basin projects conducted in the dry season (MRC 
1995). The criteria to reach ‘agreement’ are through the principle of ‘prior 
consultation’, which is defined vaguely as ‘timely notification plus additional 
data and information’ (MRC). The criteria to judge the suitability of the 
proposed projects is based on the maintenance of an ‘acceptable minimum 
monthly natural flow’ on the mainstream Mekong in the dry season at various 
identified stations (MRC). 
 11
One powerful critique of the MRC’s water usage rule is that it reflects a 
compromise to accommodate different specific interests of the member states 
rather than reflecting the concern to protect the Mekong’s fragile ecology. All 
member states have different positions to tap the Mekong resource as well as 
divergent and unique concerns over the condition of the Mekong within their 
borders.   
 
Thailand is targeting the flow of the Mekong and has plans to divert this flow. It 
is currently undergoing two ambitious schemes – the intra basin Kong-Chi-Mool 
water diversion project in the northeast and the inter basin Kok-Ing-Yom-Nan 
diversion project in the north. Kong-Chi-Mool would involve construction of a 
string of dozens of weirs, currently undergoing construction at various stages, to 
irrigate 510,000 rai of farmland in the drought stricken north-eastern region. It is 
scheduled to be completed by 2035 and expects the flow from China’s future 
upstream dams to provide sufficient surplus flow in the dry season (Prathet 
Sutabutra in Traisawasdichai, December 29, 1995a). Meanwhile, Kok-Ing-Yom-
Nan in the north aims to tap the Mekong flow at the border province of Chiang 
Rai and divert the water via the Kok and Ing rivers in the Mekong basin into the 
Yom and Nam rivers in the Chao Phya basin (Sutabutra). These two projects 
have frightened Laos and downstream Cambodia and Vietnam and were the 
cause in the past for the dismantling of the Interim Mekong Committee in 1992. 
 
For Laos, the 1995 water usage rule has opened the way for it to carry on, 
unobstructedly, construction of multiple dams for export of hydro-electricity on 
all major tributaries of the Mekong inside Laos. It is concerned about 
development activities that would cause the unnatural change of the Mekong 
flow in the mainstream channel. The Mekong flow is significant to the 
protection of the country’s world-renowned Khone Falls, which is also an 
important fishing ground in Southern Laos, on the Mekong mainstream. The 
mainstream flow of the Mekong also enables the currently functioning 
navigation route for local communities. However, its location as an upstream 
country has a significant ecological implication for downstream Cambodia and 
Vietnam. In recent years, Cambodian and Vietnamese officials have raised 
concern about the reduction of water in the two countries, pointing to upstream 
deforestation as a result of dam construction in Laos (Traisawasdichai, 
December 29, 1995a). 
 
Like Laos, the present water usage rule does not obstruct Cambodia’s plan to 
build hydro-dams. Two of its priority projects are mainstream dams – Sambor 
(3.200 MWs) and Stung Treng (3,300 MWs) (Norconsult 1994). Balancing 
conflicting interests of hydropower development and protecting the Tonle Sap 
Great Lake, the largest permanent freshwater lake in Southeast Asia (UNESCO 
1994), are both the concern and challenge for Cambodia. The unique dry-wet 
 12
hydrological regime of the Mekong has created special characteristics for the 
Great Lake and its connected Tonle Sap River. In the wet season when the 
Mekong rises, it pushes its flow into the Tonle Sap River, causing the Tonle Sap 
to reverse its course and flow back into the upstream Great Lake, which, in turn, 
enlarges its surface area three times from 3,000 square kilometres in the dry 
season to 10,000 square kilometres. In the dry season, the lake releases its water 
and feeds into the Tonle Sap, replenishing sufficient water flow for downstream 
Mekong delta (Tana 1995). The Great Lake is the main fishing ground for the 
Cambodians. The country’s fisheries production yielded 65,500 tons of fish in 
1994 and 120,000 tons at its peak in 1940 (Tana).  
 
The lake and its wild freshwater fisheries resource have been threatened by 
deforestation of the flooded forest belt surrounding the lake and by competing 
and intensive fishing practice (Tana). But the most serious threat to the ecology 
of the lake is the proposed Tonle Sap dam to be located at the mouth of the 
Great Lake. The dam is one of the eleven projects in the MRC’s present run-of-
the-river dams on the Mekong mainstream (Mekong Secretariat 1994). 
 
As for Vietnam, ensuring the natural reverse water flow of the Tonle Sap River 
into the Great Lakein Cambodia is, therefore, prominent in its concern (MRC 
1995). The protection of the fragile Mekong delta from the seawater intrusion in 
Vietnam relies greatly on the freshwater replenishment from the well-
functioning Tonle Sap Great Lake in its natural flow pattern (Hoang Trang 
Quang in Traisawasdichai, December 29, 1995b). The Mekong delta is 
Vietnam’s most productive rice farming area and, currently, aqua culture 
production, particularly shrimp farming, in the area has become another major 
activity. Both rice and shrimps are key export commodities that have helped fuel 
Vietnam’s economy over the last decade. In the past, the proposed Tonle Sap 
dam at the mouth of the Great Lake and the Thai’s ambitious intra- and inter-
basin water diversion schemes had long been the cause for uneasiness for 
Vietnam. But, this concern has been softened by an expectation that the 
Chinese´ future dams in the upstream Mekong would yield more freshwater in 
the dry season to the mainstream channel (Hoang Trang Quang, personal 
communication, December 1995), clearing away Vietnam’s anxiety about the 
lack of freshwater supply potentially caused by the Thai and Cambodian’s 
planned activities. 
  
In the past, the different concerns of the member states has, to a certain extent, 
provided some sort of leverage, checking and preventing proposed harmful 
projects that involved the use of the mainstream’s water. One incidence was 
when Vietnam, together with Laos, vetoed against the Thai’s water diversion 
scheme in 1992. But, the present Mekong framework, seen as a product of a 
compromise, facilitates each member state to implement projects using their 
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own sovereign rights, while ignoring a certain duty to protect the ecological 
integrity of the river and the responsibilities of the states not to jeopardise the 
water use by the downstream countries and communities as a result of their 
activities.  
 
Thailand has been proceeding with its Kong-Chi-Mool and Kok-Ing-Nan 
projects. Laos is active in building dams on the Mekong’s tributaries with two 
dozens of projects waiting in the pipeline. Cambodia is seeking funding to build 
Sambor Dam on the Mekong mainstream and numerous tributary projects. All of 
these practices have evaded the authority of the MRC and its proclaimed new 
environmental mandate in the present water usage rule has been criticized as 
none, but a lip service.  
 
 
The Chinese Dams 
 
How will the four lower basin states share the Mekong with China?  This 
unanswered question challenges the MRC´s very existence and its mandate. 
China controls 20 per cent of the water volume of the Mekong River and its 
activities in the upstream reach of the Mekong has both social and ecological 
consequences in the lower basin. 
 
In recent years, the effects of upstream activities in China have begun to be felt 
in the north of Thailand. Fishermen and boat drivers in Chiang Rai have been 
affected by the receding water in the dry season since China started to dam the 
Mekong (Kobsak Chutikul, in The Nation, April 2000). After the completion of 
Man Wan, China is currently building the Dachaoshan and Jinghong dams to 
produce electricity for export to Thailand. The yearly traditional catching of the 
Mekong Giant Catfish in Chiang Khong town has come to a standstill because 
of drastic decline of the fish. The decline is partly due to over fishing, the 
change of water flow and water quality. But fishermen do not rule out the 
possible impacts caused by the upstream Chinese dam construction activities, 
which are blocking the fish migration. Though these assumptions are 
speculative, they hold evidence that important baseline data regarding the 
Mekong’s ecology, aquatic biology, hydrology and social reality have not been 
in place as the basis for evaluating the impacts of any proposed or ongoing 
development projects, particularly the mainstream ones.  
Concerns of the lower riparian states over the Yunnan factor has increasingly 
grown over the last few years. These concerns range from China’s eventual 
ability to control the Mekong’s flow (Chrispin, et. al., 2000) and security threat 
by Chinese dams, to the concern about China’s unilateral practice without 
consultation, explanation and notification to downstream states. The flood crisis 
two years ago, the worst ever in three decades in the Mekong region which 
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killed more than 400 people (Reuters, 28/9/2000), triggered such concerns. 
Despite their concerns, the four downstream governments have refrained from 
responding to any of the impacts and potential effects from upstream Chinese 
activities for fear of affecting the carefully groomed diplomacy with China.  
 
Instead, they have attempted to seek greater cooperation from China when 
Thailand and Laos signed the commercial navigation of the Mekong River pact 
with China and Burma two years ago. The navigation pact, which China had 
long been enthusiastic for, covers navigation of 786 kilometres from Simao in 
Yunnan to Luang Prabang of Laos. The pact, which benefits China most, will 
allow free flow of goods from landlocked Yunnan to the southern Mekong 
market (The Nation, 21/4/2000). Yet, expectation that greater economic 
cooperation would bring China to closer cooperation has not yet proved right 
after eight years of the ongoing GMS’s economic and infrastructure 
programmes.  
 
Apparently, there has been no diplomatic leverage among the lower basin states 
to negotiate or coordinate with China to seek way for proper sharing of the 
Mekong River. No attempt has so far been made to use the MRC forum to voice 
the concern of the lower basin states over the potential environmental and 
security threats from the Chinese dams. The MRC has been obviously by-passed 
even by its member states, leaving it with no concrete diplomatic influence, nor 
ability to fulfil its environmental protection mandate. As critique points out, the 
MRC is most effectively functioning merely as a forum for member states to 
channel technical and financial assistance from bi and multilateral donors. 
 
 
Consultants and dams: the case of Nam Theun 2 in Laos 
 
The intensification of hydropower development programme in Laos, beginning 
in the early 1990s, has brought two significant consequences. One is the fierce 
contestation of resource between the place-based local communities and the 
alliance of the non place-based foreign private dam building industry, the Lao 
government and international pro-dam agencies like the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank as well as western donors from countries with strong 
tradition of dam-building. In such a setting of contestation, the relation of power 
is a dramatically unbalanced one and the shifting of power relations, in the 
present social and political reality in communist Laos, is unlikely to happen in 
the near future. 
 
The other consequence has been the rise of the professions of environmental 
consultancy, hitherto unfamiliar in Laos. Yet, such expertise has been drawn 
internationally from countries with dam-building tradition both in the west and 
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within the region. There are various forms of these consultants, ranging from 
individual experts working for firms to staff of advocacy groups and sometimes 
specially-set up advisory panels. The role of these consultants is highly 
‘political’ because their activities, pertaining the process of producing reports 
and documents submitted to policy makers, are the basis of the eventual 
‘political’ decision, which determines who gets the contested resource in 
question and when.   
 
The role of consultants in Laos has come under critical scrutiny through the 
debate of the proposed Nam Theun 2 project, the country’s largest dam plan. If 
built, the 900-megawatt Nam Theun 2 would flood 450 sq kms of the Nakai 
Plateau forest with high bio-diversity, home for several threatened wildlife 
species, and destroy both aquatic biology and fishery-based livelihood of 
communities in three rivers in central Laos – Theun, Xe Bang Fai and Hinboun 
(Roberts 1997).  
 
Seen as the first attempt to grapple the issues of the cost and benefit of Nam 
Theun 2 was the powerful justification of the project by two international 
conservation groups, the IUCN and the US-based World Conservation Society 
(WCS). They concluded in their joint report: ‘..the establishment of the Nakai-
Nam Theun Conservation Area as a biodiversity conservation area of 
international standard is one of the principle mitigation measures of the Nam 
Theun 2 hydropower project.’ (IUCN &WCS, 1997). What has been missing 
from this analysis is what constitutes the social and environmental cost of the 
construction of the dam project. The analysis simply missed out the cost of 
losing the entire 450-sq km Nakai Plateau forest in the proposed reservoir area. 
The displacement of 5,000 indigenous people in both the reservoir area and the 
conservation area and of some 50,000 people in the nearby Xe Bang Fai basin 
were out of discussion. But, both the forest loss and people displacement have 
been turned into a necessary trade-off for the creation of the ‘world-class 
conservation area’. The conservationists’ suggestion of the benefit of Nam 
Theun 2 has been attacked by other critique as supporting a paradoxical 
argument of ‘damming to save the forest’. Yet, what has been forgotten is the 
description that the construction of the dam is itself the cause of forest 
destruction in the first place. 
  
The quality of the study of dam impacts on aquatic biology also puts the validity 
of consultancy into question. In the report, there was no fundamental baseline 
data, including fish migration and behaviour, to form the basis to evaluate the 
dam impacts. Despite unknown impacts, the study proposed several possible 
mitigation measures, including the potential of using a fish ladder. It stressed 
that there was a need ‘..to clear the vegetation in the reservoir [to improve both 
water quality and fish development in the reservoir], to design and test re-
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aeration devices and ..to investigate the feasibility of biologically sound fish-
ladders’ (Kottelat 1996).  
 
The study added: ‘If a fish way or fish ladder is considered in the final design of 
the project, it should be designed as soon as migration data become available, in 
close consultation between engineers and biologists.’ (Kottelat). 
  
Seen as embedded in the logic of this aquatic biology study is the assumption 
that the decision has already been made to build the Nam Theun 2 project. This 
assumption permeates the report to the extent that the purpose of assessing the 
dam impacts has been turned into a search for technical solution in order to 
reach the eventual goal of dam building. The aquatic biology impacts, involving 
the potential killing of large number of wild river fish and the loss of existing 
subsistence fisheries in the three watersheds (Roberts 1997) have been 
downplayed, ignored and even unstudied and hence undocumented. Instead, a 
range of technical solutions have been proposed, including the design and study 
of fish ladder, that seem likely to create new jobs for the consultant circles. A 
fish ladder; for example, has already shown to be an unsound mitigation 
measure and a waste of money for Thailand’s infamous Pak Mool Dam on 
another important tributary of the Mekong. 
 
The role of environmental consultants is both strategic and important and, 
nevertheless, not unproblematic. They can choose to keep the affected 
communities informed about what constitutes the risks from the project in 
question and encourage an open democratic planning process. Or they can 
choose to believe in their professional expertise and assume that they know what 
is good for the affected communities. Their understanding of the political 
implication of their role and the will to involve the task of their ‘communicative 
action’ (Forester 1980) to promote dialogue and enhance participation from 
affected communities are, therefore, crucial factors that determine the quality 
and validity of the outcome of their reports, plans and programmes.  
 
Nam Theun 2 exemplifies how the consultants, consciously or not, have helped 
to advance the dam-builders’ interests, while foreclosing the affected 
communities’ awareness of the risk of the project and their effective 
participation, by emphasizing the project’s benefits and downplaying its 
environmental and social impacts. Alternatively, if they are attentive to the 
prevalent domination of power, which is termed by Forester as the structure of 
‘systematically-distorted communication’ (1980), they can help to redress this. 
They can choose to seek a way to include the views and data that those in power 
have wanted to erase. Otherwise, the dam consultants are merely becoming part 
of this pro-dam structure of ‘systematically-distorted communication’ 
themselves. 
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Communication from below: the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Resistance  
 
After ten year’s blockade by the World Bank-sponsored Pak Mool Dam, the 
Mool River, Thailand’s largest tributary of the Mekong, is once again running 
free. In May last year, the Thai government has responded to the demand of 
affected river communities to open the dam’s gates to allow fish from the 
Mekong to migrate and spawn upriver in the Mool. It was initially a three-month 
trial period but has later been raised to one year for a full study to find out what 
it is like when the river is let free again and whose stories of this unresolved, 
perhaps irresolvable, conflict about the value of the Mool River are to be 
believed -- the river communities’ or the dam owner’s. 
 
The Mool River villagers in their tenacious struggle against the construction of 
Pak Mool have today become the legend of Thailand’s most organized 
grassroots movement overtly challenging the dominant power of the state. The 
movement came into existence twelve years ago in response to the plan by the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (Egat) to build the 136-megawatt 
Pak Mool Dam near the estuary of the Mool and Mekong in the border district 
of Khong Chiam, Ubol Ratchathani north-eastern province. The conflict erupted 
when Egat secretly managed to insert on the Cabinet’s meeting agenda the 
proposal of Pak Mool project as part of the larger Kong-Chi-Mool irrigation 
scheme for the drought-stricken north-eastern region during the touring of the 
Chatichai Cabinet in this north-eastern province of Khon Kaen. Out of the 
sudden, on April 8, 1989, the touring Cabinet approved the Pak Mool Dam 
project in principle without consultation and participation from the affected 
communities. 
 
Pak Mool, seen as Egat’s last possibility of dam building in Thailand, was 
approved amid the peak of the anti-dam building sentiment in the country. It was 
the period when Egat’s dam-building policy was most scrutinized, following the 
government’s indefinite shelving of Egat’s two dams -- the Nam Choan Dam 
proposed in the World Heritage Site’s Thung Yai Naresuan wildlife sanctuary in 
the west and the Kaeng Krung Dam in the South, as well as the eruption of local 
protest against the Royal Irrigation Department’s Kaeng Sua Ten Dam in the 
north. The battle of Pak Mool is, therefore, not only a battle of the ideologies of 
development between the state and the communities. But, it is a battle of dignity, 
which Egat cannot afford to lose in reclaiming faith from the public. This battle 
entails a tense system of control in which Egat has resorted to its financial and 
bureaucratic power to monopolize the information system and the channel of 
communication with the public. Its tactics involved a strategy of divide and rule, 
thereby splitting up communities into groups of enemies. It has succeeded in 
keeping away the sympathy and involvement from the urban-middle class 
groups from the very beginning of the conflict. It could foresee that the flooding 
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of the Kaeng Saphue rapids, a major tourist attraction for local people and 
outside tourists, in Phibul Mangsaharn district, would trigger this conflict. Egat 
has promised to maintain the Kaeng Saphue rapids for one month in April by 
lowering the water level in the reservoir down to the original level. Its previous 
defeat to the resistance movement against the Nam Choan and Kaeng Krung 
dams demonstrated the strength of the middle class groups. Therefore Egat 
wants at all cost to keep the involvement of the urban middle class at bay. Its 
attempt to illegitimize the anti-Pak Mool resistance movement has for the entire 
period of the last decade allowed Egat to control the whole discourse of Pak 
Mool.  
   
It is the familiar notion of the state that the unidimensional pro-growth 
development model requires sacrifice from a ‘handful’ group of people for the 
‘public interest’. Displacement of river communities, disruption of their 
fisheries-based livelihood and destruction of river ecology are seen as necessary 
sacrifice for the generation of 136 megawatts of electricity.   
 
Yet, the anti-Pak Mool Dam resistance movement has refused to accept this 
official notion of development, nor the state’s enclosure of communicative 
space. They have sought their way to penetrate the wall of state’s uniformity to 
tell their stories in countless protests and to demand their participation in 
decision-making. Their long lasting and openly-declared resistance has matured 
them and helped them to develop a shared meaning and conception for their 
struggle. This shared consciousness signifies their right to the collective 
ownership of the Mool River. Their declared objective, ‘returning the Mool to 
our children’, serves to create a new paradigm of development, in which local 
communities assert their right to determine an alternative development of how to 
best use the Mool River’s resource. Their success to force Egat to open the dam 
gates is a first but important incremental step towards this redefined goal of 
decommissioning the dam, restoring and returning the Mool River to their 
children. 
 
The True Story of Pak Mool 
When the World Commission on Dam released its report in 2000, Pak Mool 
became known for its defects of all aspects of a hydropower scheme. For the 
whole decade, the Pak Mool discourse has been directed towards obscuring the 
real cause of the conflict. The anti-Pak Mool Dam protesters have received no 
public sympathy but became known as greedy trouble-makers who endlessly 
demanded more compensation.  
 
Yet, for the first time, the failure of Pak Mool Dam, which has long been 
concealed by Egat and denied by its sponsor, the World Bank, has been 
scientifically confirmed by the WCD report. The findings in the report have 
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clarified this decade-long confusion. And, if anything, Egat’s credibility is 
seriously being questioned.  
 
The WCD’s findings stated that Pak Mool was carried out without adequate 
environmental impact studies. It has failed to deliver its promised benefits and 
created both environmental and social damage to the communities. Pak Mool 
produced only 20.81 megawatts, in contrast to its estimated capacity of 136 
MWs. The project was presented as a ‘multi-purpose’ development scheme, but 
irrigation benefits of a ‘run-of-the-river’ project were doubtful. Upstream 
reservoir fisheries yielded around ten kilograms per hectare per year instead of 
the estimated 100 kgs per hectare per year without fish stocking or 220 kgs per 
hectare per year with the fish stocking programme (WCD 2000 cited in The 
Bangkok Post, December 2000 and IRN’s briefing, December 2000).  
 
In terms of environmental damage, the WCD report stated that the number of 
fish species has been reduced from 265 before the dam was built to 90 species 
while upstream fish catches have declined by 60-80 per cent. The dam 
permanently submerged more than 50 rapids, which served as the natural habitat 
for many fish species. The submergence of the rapids was not mentioned in the 
EIA report and; thus, the implication of the loss of rapids was not assessed. The 
actual number of households displaced by the dam was 1,700 instead of 241 as 
predicted in the EIA as a result of the declining fishing yields. The project cost 
was higher than estimated. Compensation and resettlement costs increased 182 
per cent from the estimated 231.55 million baht to 1,1131.1 million baht while 
compensation for fisheries loss, unanticipated in the original estimate, accounted 
for 395.6 million baht. In terms of mitigation measures, the two-million-baht 
fish ladder has failed to help upstream fish migration. The stocking of fresh 
water prawn (Macrobrachium Rosenbergi) is unlikely to generate income as the 
species cannot breed in fresh water. In sum, the WCD’s study says: ‘If all the 
benefits and costs were adequately assessed, it is unlikely that the Pak Mool 
project would be [built today]’ (WCD, cited in the Bangkok Post and IRN, 
December 2000). 
 
The Voice of Difference 
At the heart of the Pak Mool discourse, several fierce contestations have 
unfolded, involving the issues of aquatic biology and fisheries, the ecological 
value of the Mool, and the dam’s economic rationale. These contestations 
unravel the voice of Mool River villagers, in contrast to the state’s dominant 
description of the value of the Mool, and celebrate, not undervalue, their cultural 
difference.  
 
At time prior to the dam construction when the conflict erupted, the key 
contestation centred on whether or not fish migrate between Mekong and Mool 
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and whether the dam would block the fish migration. Contesting Egat’s refusal 
about fish migration between Mool and Mekong, the Mool River villagers 
explained the interrelation of the two rivers and why fish was abundant in the 
Mool. For this, they told the story of the ‘two colour rivers’. 
 
‘The Mekong is earth red but the Mool is blue. It’s because the water in the 
Mool is clearer and the Mekong is much muddier. At the confluence, the river is 
called the Two-Colour River because of these contrasting colours. In the rainy 
season, when the Mekong rises, the fish are pushed by its strong current. Then, 
the clearer water in the Mool attracts them to swim upriver to spawn in the 
Mool. When the two river rise, they flood the forest and bushes along the banks 
of the Mool. This flooded forest becomes shelter for the fish that come from the 
Mekong,’ said Roen Kluikaew, a respected old lady of Hua Hew Village, whose 
fishing skill and knowledge has been recognized by other fisher folk of the Mool 
River (personal communication, February 1992). 
  
In response to strong criticism that the dam would block the fish migration, Egat 
built the fish ladder attached to one end of the Pak Mool Dam. Yet, the legacy of 
the fish ladder reveals both its technical mistake and the unmitigable impacts of 
Pak Mool. The fish ladder was built too steep and remains dry for half a year in 
the dry season as a result of the cost cutting from ten million baht to two million 
baht (Traisawasdichai, March 10, 1995). Modelled on the fish ladder in the west 
to help salmon jump over the dams to spawn upriver, of which success is still 
doubtful, the fish pass at Pak Mool has failed to accommodate the unknown and 
unstudied behaviour of 265 different fish species of the Mool (WCD cited in the 
Bangkok Post and IRN, December 2000).  
 
Fish that use the ladder in the rainy season were found injured and some die 
before they could swim or jump pass the 17-metre high dam to spawn in the 
reservoir, as it was intended by the design engineer. For those that survive the 
hard journey on the ladder, the possibility for them to further survive in the 
unfavourable condition of the reservoir water is questionable. Some small fish 
were found using the ladder but they were of no economic value and were too 
small in size and number to be sufficient to replenish fish stock for the Mool. 
Many fish were often found dead in the turbine outlets, located at the other end 
in the opposite direction to the fish pass. The stronger water current from the 
turbines attracts the fish to the turbines (personal communication with villagers 
and fishery officials, 1996). 
 
Despite the failure, Egat released its commercial advertisement on the television 
throughout 1996 to promote the success of the fish ladder, advertising that it has 
helped the communities to sustain their traditional diet of fermented fish.  
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The competing views pertaining the natural value of the Mool concerned the 
ecological implications of the river rapids. The Mool River villagers protested at 
once when Egat blasted Tad Hua Phu and Khan Hew rapids to create a water 
channel next to the spillway of the `run-of-the-river´ Pak Mool dam. The 
destruction of the rapids was not mentioned in the environmental impact studies. 
Speaking from experience about ecology and spiritual attachment with the Mool 
River, the villagers described the rapids as the ‘kingdom of fish’. The pools 
associated with the rapids serve as the shelter for the tired fish that swim upriver 
from the Mekong to spawn in the Mool and as the ‘asylum’ for young fishes to 
hide themselves from their predators in numerous holes of the rapids 
(Traisawasdichai, March 1, 1992). Yet, this local view of the Mool River’s value 
was both ignored and undervalued by the authority. Egat contended that rapids 
formations were simply rocks and that the blasting of the rapids was merely an 
ordinary technical work to improve the water channel (Supin Panyamark, in 
Traisawasdichai, March 1, 1992). 
 
The contestation over Pak Mool’s economic rationale is related to the link 
between the dam’s projected electricity output and the unique Mool-Mekong’s 
hydrological regime. The local communities warned from the outset that Pak 
Mool, with its location near the estuary of the Mool and Mekong, would risk 
failing to function because the Mool became a reverse river during the wet 
season. In the rainy season, the Mekong downstream the dam swells and pushes 
its flow back into the Mool, which also rises at the same time. The villagers 
warned that the swell of the Mekong, when meeting the 17-metre high dam, 
would leave no head available for Pak Mool facility to run the turbine and 
generate electricity (personal communication, 1992 and 1995). Yet, no one 
listened to their voice. Egat and its engineers chose to believe in the superiority 
of science and technology of dam building over local knowledge of the river 
ecology. Their ignorance to the local warning was more a combination of the 
engineers’ excitement to test the new technology to build the first ‘run-of-the-
river dam in Thailand and the belief in the power of technology to control the 
flow of the Mool River. However, the villagers’ prediction has proved right as 
the dam can only produce 20.81 megawatts – an amount over six times less than 
its estimated capacity. Egat engineers have also admitted this fact, saying the 
dam cannot generate electricity in the rainy season because of the rise of the 
Mekong (personal communication, January 2002). 
 
The Mool River’s Defenders 
If the portrait of a nation is created by its selection of certain memories for its 
citizens to remember, causing them to forget certain events, then the struggle 
against being forgotten is the strategy of resistance for the Mool River 
communities. Their gathering at the three-year-old protest village, called Mae 
Mool Man Yuen (long-lasting Mool), which signifies the ‘nodes of resistance’, 
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juxtaposing the `nodes of control´ of the Pak Mool Dam and its power plant 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997), indicates the villagers’ determination to refuse to 
accept the official vision of development. Organized on a rotational basis to 
standby in the protest village, they have turned the makeshift huts into their 
second home, making a real living from fishing, weaving baskets and grass 
brooms and opening a village coffee house. They have turned the property, Egat 
has planned to build a recreational park, into a lively village with a school for 
the protestors’ children, a monument of the poor, a meeting hall overseeing the 
dam’s spillway and a centre stage which they use both for serious gathering for 
the protest work and for the village’s traditional drama and music performance 
at night to entertain themselves. 
 
On a deeper level, they are there to tell their stories about what it is the 
construction of the world Bank-sponsored Pak Mool has done to their life, to 
revitalize their own vision of the kind of development they hope for, to reclaim 
the pride of their river-based livelihood and to assert their right to force the state 
to return the river to the communities. In short, Mae Mool Man Yuen is the 
village of the Mool River fighters and the school for those who are interested to 
learn and appreciate the fighting spirit and the struggle of the ordinary people 
against power. 
 
Yet, the growing strength of the Mool River villagers and their conceptual 
sophistication in their struggle for inclusion into the decision making process 
was not built in a day. They started out twelve years ago as unorganized 
inexperienced submerged networks (Escobar 1998, Mittelman 2000), seeking 
way to create their own channel of opinion formation and communication. As 
the impacts of the dam became more apparent, the submerged networks grew, 
gaining new members, and networking with other peripheral, grassroots groups. 
Their method through the exercise of ‘war of position and war of movement’ 
Mittelman), has always been non-violent, despite at times confronting with 
official use of force, propaganda and imprisonment intimidation. This involves 
persistent rounds of writing appeals to authorities, visiting the World Bank 
office in Bangkok, marching the town barefoot, exhibiting their unused fishing 
gears, staging hunger strikes and sit-in protests, occupying the dam site, 
blocking Bangkok streets, camping outside the Government House and invading 
it to meet the prime minister when he fell on deaf ears to listen to their voice 
after months of protest. Their three-year-on camping at Mae Mool Man Yuen 
protest village at the dam site is ensuring that their struggle, suffering and 
intention will not be erased from the history of the Pak Mool Dam like other 
forgotten stories of their fellows who had been sacrificed to make way for 
construction of other dams in Thailand.  
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Their unending struggle against the Pak Mool Dam has set a new standard for 
the politics of resistance to both the state and other marginalized grassroots 
groups. New kinds of demands have emerged, challenging the state’s dominant 
culture of rule-setting pertaining compensation for affected communities in 
development projects. Their demand for compensation for lost income from 
fishing in the Mool River during the three-year construction phase of Pak Mool 
and for the lost livelihood after the completion of the dam are evidence of the 
previously erased impacts that the state’s construction of a dam could cost. Pak 
Mool has become the most expensive dam Egat has ever built because of the 
unexpected increase of compensation cost (Egat officials, personal 
communication, 1996). 
 
Yet, the Mool River villagers are not fighting only against the Pak Mool Dam. 
They are now engaged in a broader political commitment, in which they have 
become part of the larger network of marginalized grassroots groups, called the 
Assembly of the Poor. Encompassing diversified objectives, yet with a shared 
identity of the marginalized poor, the Mool River villagers through the 
Assembly of the Poor are now aiming for a broader goal towards a ‘post 
development’ agenda (Escobar 1998). They are challenging the Thai state to 
acknowledge and respect their different culture, pride and aspiration.   
 
Through time and maturation, their ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 1990, Bryant & 
Bailey 1997) has been elaborated and become deeply sophisticated. A new 
dimension and way to assert their right to defend and restore the Mool River has 
been added. By demanding the opening of the dam’s gates to allow the fish to 
return to the Mool River, they have turned the agenda of the Pak Mool discourse 
upside down. They have now refused to negotiate under the presupposition of 
the singular owner of the dam, but have created a new agenda based on the 
collective ownership of the river.♦ In other words, the owners of the Mool River 
have decided that they want to stop granting permission for the dam owner, 
which has been operating on a part of their river for the last twelve years. 
‘Returning the Mool to our children’ is, therefore, a strategy for the counter-
hegemonic agenda, guiding the Mool River villagers movement towards their 
eventual goal of decommissioning Pak Mool. 
 
 
                                                          
♦ The concept of ownership of the river was once proposed by a Thai scholar, Nithi 
Eawsriwong, as a basis for conflict resolution of Pak Mool Dam between the authorities 
and affected communities. He proposed that the resolution should be based on a dialogue 
among communities along the Mool, who are the owners of the river, to define and decide 
the pattern of how to best manage the Mool (personal communication with second hand 
source). 
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Conclusion 
 
In the complexities of resource contestation, the profession of planning is 
applied as a tool to decide the distribution of the resource. Planning is not an 
objective, value-neutral and non-political device as planners and those who hire 
them, like to think of as such. Planners can serve to mediate the distribution of 
wealth and reinforce power, or alternatively, withhold them. In the Mekong 
context, regional and national authorities, influenced by external bi- and 
multilateral agencies, are keen to promote the official top-down development 
process that increasingly creates social, economic and political marginality. 
They are imposing a grand narrative of ‘sustainability’ on to the people, 
deciding on their behalf that this official vision could be reached by the 
construction of dams. Yet, the official narrative of ‘sustainability’, based on 
economic and technical rationality, clearly precludes ecological protection and 
reinforces social inequality by obstructing communities from their present 
access to the resource. In this context, planners are operating in the face of 
power domination of the bureaucracy and institutions or in Forester’s sense the 
‘structure of systematically distorted communication of assurance, threat, 
promise and legitimation’ (Forester 1980: 283). Here, planners must make a 
choice about whom they want to serve and which sets of values they are 
promoting. Planners can redress this power imbalance and promote the 
consultation process and dialogue with affected communities. However, the 
interplay of power in the hydropower discourse in the Mekong has made it 
impossible to create enabling communication that ensures the authentic 
inclusion of the affected communities in the planning and decision making 
process. More often than not, planners, such as environmental consultants or 
advisors for hydropower projects, as shown in Nam Theun 2 case, become part 
of the structure of ‘systematically distorted communication’ themselves.  
 
In response, affected grassroots communities, as the anti-Pak Mool Dam 
resistance movement demonstrates, mobilized themselves, launching their 
struggles in defence of their culture, livelihood and ecology. They are 
communicating other forms of knowledge that encompass difference and 
diversity. They insist that planning needs to pay attention to context specific and 
respect the culture of the others.  
 
The interplay of power in the Mekong oriented towards dam building implies 
that the collective actions of the affected local communities based on defence of 
nature and ecology -- either organized or unorganized, articulated or 
unarticulated forms of submerged networks (Escobar), are the main ingredient to 
counteract the `structure of distorted communication´ and transform 
undemocratic into democratic decision making. Yet, this is not to dismiss the 
possibility to encompass the aid-for-undistorted communication (Sager 1992) 
 25
based on communicative rationality in the formal planning and decision making 
process. Yet, this is provided that planners must drop the deeply-embedded 
pretence of the apolitical nature of their profession. Indeed, both approaches – 
the collective social movement and communicative rationality, are necessary, if 
the counter-hegemonic efforts are to effectively challenge the asymmetrical 
distribution of power. 
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